O excepcional interesse socioeconômico no controle de constitucionalidade difuso: (des)necessidade de replicação da “unidade de análise econômica” argentina ao modelo brasileiro

Abstract

Positioned within the research field of Democratic State of Law and Access to Justice, with emphasis on comparative constitutional control in Latin America, this Master’s Thesis aims to investigate the potential for replicating the Argentine Economic Analysis Unit, established by the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation through Acordada n. 36/09, in order to assist the exercise of Brazilian constitutional jurisdiction in the applying temporal modulation of the effects of unconstitutionality decisions in incidental diffuse control based on exceptional social interest regarding matters with socioeconomic repercussions, given the significant difficulties identified for handling this judgment technique by the ministers of the Brazilian Supreme Court, especially related to the absence of a technical body capable of objectively and impartially assessing possible socioeconomic consequences resulting from an eventual declaration of unconstitutionality whose effectiveness has the power to exceed the subjective limits of the concrete case, due to the systematics of general repercussion inherent in extraordinary appeals. Examining the advantages and disadvantages of replicating this institute and adapting the Argentine model to the specificities of Brazilian constitutional jurisdiction, it is proposed to create a permanent administrative body called Economic Analysis Unit, responsible for assessing, through non-binding technical pronouncements, the effective impacts on public resources allocated to social public policy resulting from an eventual declaration of unconstitutionality raised concretely and incidentally before the Brazilian Supreme Court.