Epistemologia da ignorância: sobre a natureza da ignorância proposicional

Abstract

In this work, I discuss the nature of propositional ignorance, the possibility of non-factive ignorance and the applicability of this analysis to some topics of analytic epistemology. My intention is, first, to present a critical introduction to the discussion between two relevant alternatives that dispute the definition of ignorance, namely, the Standard View and the New View. For the former, ignorance is the absence of knowledge; for the second, the absence of true belief. Considering this divergence, each of these alternatives will be exposed given how they define ignorance and the specific conditions for propositional ignorance. Furthermore, both conceptions of propositional ignorance will be briefly contrasted based on some topics present in the current debate. Second, I intend to point out that, unlike how these conceptions of ignorance are presupposed, propositional ignorance is not reduced to the structure “S is ignorant that P” or similar variants of this structure. Reading propositional ignorance reduced in terms of "S is ignorant that P", these views do not make the best analysis of propositional ignorance. This is because, on the one hand, they generate a problem that refers to a possibility that has been little worked on. It is about the possibility of non-factive ignorance and the problem, as will be shown, is that in this reduction there are good reasons both to affirm and to deny this possibility. This constitutes, at least, as a relevant theorical tension that can compromise these conceptions and the analyzes carried out based on them. On the other hand, this reduction excludes at least a general and not necessarily factual sense of propositional ignorance, which deprives us of a more adequate analysis of ignorance and other related issues. Having this problem and its consequences in view, I will point to a hypothesis that has the potential to dissolve it by reformulating how we understand propositional ignorance, inheriting the advantages of reasons in favor and of reasons against the possibility of non-factive ignorance and overcoming the objections raised against them. In addition, finally, this reformulated analysis of propositional ignorance will be applied to some relevant topics of analytic epistemology that are essentially relate to ignorance, but which have not been sufficiently debated in this relationship to ignorance, namely, education, suspension of judgment and investigation. In this application, I will be aiming at a clarification of these relationships and showing that there are other ways to point out the adequacy of this reformulation. Thus, this work aims to contribute to the dissemination in Portuguese of a recent but growing discussion in analytical epistemology, as well as to the theoretical development in this area.