Liberdade e autoridade – por uma conciliação

Abstract

It´s perceived that both propaedeutic commentators of the Hannah Arendt´s books and her more conceptual critics, make such a characteristic and punctual approach between the autority and the freedom, that generally, it´s suspected, it up hiding ends any possibility of affinity of these concepts. In general lines, this dissertation is guided by the objective of clarifying the possible conciliation between the concepts of autority and freedom in Hannah Arendt´s political philosophy. Books of the 1960 decade, notably On revolution (1963) and Between past and the future (1968), and also some of his essays, in which Arendt asserts that, if on the one hand, the ancien régime distanced the freedom public from mens, recaptures, in this perspective, but doesnt limits it, on the other hand, the seventeenth century revoluctions faced difficulties in an attempt to conceive another anchor reference for a new political authority whose purpose would be to ensure the revolutionary spirit of participation. From a theoretical point of view, it is understood that, when trying to reconcile authority with republican freedom, some modern philosophers ended up denying authority and making full freedom impossible. For Hobbes, but also for Rousseau, authority is understood around the concept of sovereignty. For if for the former authority corresponded to the Sovereign properly constituted and immune to any challenge, for the second, the authority corresponded to the people themselves, who, as a result of a "General Will", ended up being defined in terms of sovereignty. In this sense, public freedom was undermined, because if Rousseau admitted a certain public participation of the people in a 1765 book, he denied it in his 1772 book. In contemporary republican theory, Norberto Bobbio is seen, which evokes a middle ground between the representation and participation of a democracy, and Philip Pettit, who, in his neorepublicanism, advocates a negative freedom whose participation is reduced to contestation in the face of arbitrary domination. But freedom in Hannah Arendt's work is participation in the affairs of politics, and it is through her that the entire revolution is built. However, if in theory and in practice the establishment of the new republican authority caused a certain impediment to republican freedom, Arendt is based on the actions of the revolutionary council system and proves this incompatibility to be false. To justify this claim, we return to the approach of the sense of politics in the face of the emergence of the totalitarian regime and its source of authority. We also look at how the relationship of the authoritarian regime appears in Hannah Arendt's thinking. Finally, we analyze the relationship between the revolutionary freedom of the council system and the new republican authority in the form of a constitution. Given the above, we believe we can suggest that, despite the concept of sovereignty, Arendt admits a link of conciliation between public authority and freedom.